In his book, curiously titled Alone in the Ring – Decision-Making in Critical Times, General NC Vij, former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), captures the imagination of readers with an absorbing narration of recent military campaigns and the administrative reforms undertaken under his stewardship. He strongly advocates the need for a well-defined National Security Strategy (NSS), expressing concern that some major military reforms are being held back in the absence of a clear NSS.
Tracing the root cause of the Kargil conflict, the author states that “Capture of Kashmir has always been an obsession with Pakistan and is deeply embedded in its national psyche”. He analyses the conflict in detail, deliberating on the political considerations, challenges faced in joint planning and execution, intelligence failure, lessons learnt and outcomes of the Kargil conflict. Appreciating the role of the IAF, which restricted its operations to the Indian side of LOC, he concludes that this strategy prevented Pakistan from bringing its own Air Force into the battle. The author quotes the former DG ISI, Gen Shahid Aziz of Pakistan, who confessed during later years that the Kargil misadventure was a failure and the Pakistani military leadership failed to anticipate the Indian response, striking instant resemblance to the aftermath of the recent misadventure at Pahalgam.
The Indian Parliament attack on 13 December 2001 enraged every Indian, and public opinion was strongly in favour of a swift military response to teach Pakistan a lesson. Though all the five terrorists of JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba who perpetrated the attack were gunned down inside the Parliament premises, Pakistan refused to acknowledge its involvement despite providing adequate proof. What followed was “Operation Parakram”, which the author dealt with in detail. Following the quick mobilisation by the first week of January 2002, the Army Chief declared that the Army was ready for war along with the IAF and Indian Navy, which also declared their operational readiness.
Avoided military offensive
Confirmation of the same by the National Security Advisor and indications that India was ready to cross the LOC, sent ripples across the international community. Under pressure from the US and the Western powers, Gen Musharraf resorted to mellowed-down overtures, which persuaded the Indian political leadership to avoid a military offensive despite full-scale mobilisation. Quoting General Padmanabhan, who was the Army Chief then, the author recounts that dilemma and lack of clarity in the political leadership prevented Indian armed forces from achieving significant military gains, including the possible capture of disputed territory in J & K.
Writing about India’s role in Peace Keeping Missions, Gen Vij describes the circumstances under which 3,660 Indian soldiers were deployed as a part of a UN Mission in Sierra Leone in early 2000. However, in May 2000, 223 Indian soldiers and eleven military observers were held hostage by a local rebel guerrilla group – Revolutionary United Front (RUF). When diplomacy and negotiations failed to secure the release of hostages, even after 75 days in captivity, military action was resorted to, securing the release of all hostages. The operation demonstrated the potential of the Indian Armed Forces, as accolades poured in from all over the world, lauding the meticulous planning and execution with minimal collateral damage.
The author explains how he always believed erecting a strong fence along the LOC was the surest way to curtail infiltration and cross-border training. On becoming the COAS, when the author discussed the proposal internally, the feedback was anything but encouraging, with some seniors dismissing the suggestion as impractical and reflective of a defensive mindset.
But the Chief persisted with his idea and convinced his colleagues to erect a fence on a trial basis. True to his belief, a substantial reduction in infiltration was observed on the ground, and soon, the army leadership worked on expanding the project to other areas. Despite heavy firing from across the border and facing other complexities, a 740 km fence was erected along the LOC by Indian troops in just over a year, which was later improved upon and augmented by his successors.
Theatre commands
Writing about the “Cold Start Doctrine”, which was conceptualised during Operation Parakram, the author states that it has since been improvised further and perfected over the years. He strongly advocates the need to evolve from mere “jointness” to an advanced level of “integration and interoperability” among the armed forces, particularly in order to leverage emerging technologies. He supports the idea of establishing theatre commands, with a suggestion that theatre commanders must report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee through the CDS, which may be a matter of debate.
On the various administrative reforms undertaken in the last few years of his service, the author explains the rationale behind increasing the number of vacancies in all ranks, thereby ensuring a younger age profile of the Commanding Officers, and how it was achieved through the recommendations of the AV Singh Committee in two distinct phases. He also writes about how he passionately pushed for implementing the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), which has benefited lakhs of veterans and their families in the last two decades. His contribution to furthering such causes not only made a positive impact on soldiering as a profession but also his concern for families and their well-being, which will forever serve as an inspiration for future military leaders.
“Wars are always unpredictable, and therefore we must always be prepared,” concludes General Vij in the book, which is contemporary, engaging, and informative. It is a great read for all military book lovers.
The reviwer, Gp Capt Dr R Venkataraman (retd), is General Manager, Madras Management Association)
You can find the book here.