The war that doesn’t affect us

The TV cameras begin rolling as soon as the bodies arrive. The sight of the slain soldiers of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), killed in a Maoist ambush and covered with the Indian national flag, has become our Dreiserian opera. Before such an event, or afterwards, we are just not interested in what is happening in Chhattisgarh or other Maoist-affected areas in central and eastern India — we are not interested because thinking about it becomes an incubus. We do not want that; we do not want to engage with it beyond the flashes of rage we display in front of our television screens. That is our only contribution to the crisis and then we withdraw.

But that doesn’t make things go away in Chhattisgarh. In fact, they become more serious once we close our eyes or turn them away. That is why it is important to understand what is happening in our own backyard.

Since 2010, there has been a sustained presence of security forces in the Maoist-affected areas. The CRPF forms the core of the troops sent by the Centre to fight the Maoists. The Maoist problem, as many who have seen the situation on ground keep telling Delhi, is a socio-economic problem that stems from decades of marginalisation and exploitation of the adivasis in large swathes of land (in the undivided Bastar region in Chhattisgarh, for example, which is bigger than Kerala). Even after India attained her freedom, nothing changed for the people in this region. They remained a victim of the State’s apathy, of its absence. From 1980 onwards, the Maoists appeared on the scene and simply filled the void left by the Indian State. They began on a good note, giving the adivasis a sense of empowerment, promising to change their lives. But soon, their focus shifted from welfare to fighting the State. The State, meanwhile, remained oblivious to the utter lack of development in this region.

It took the Centre many years to accept that the Maoist problem is not a law-and-order problem. But, on ground, it was reluctant to make changes in its policy. It failed to understand that security operations in the Maoist-affected areas need to be an adjunct to the deliverance of basic needs to the people here: access to food and safe drinking water, and a right to education and medical care.

The Centre continued to use the presence of Maoist guerrillas in the region as an excuse for misgovernance. The CRPF troops were sent in, but in the absence of a tangible intelligence apparatus, they have not been able to effectively tackle the Maoists. By the sheer presence of the CRPF and other paramilitary forces in such large numbers, the Maoists may have been pushed deeper into their bastions, but they haven’t gone away.

In the meantime, the adivasis’ first contact with the State comes in the form of the CRPF troops. In many areas, they disallow them to venture into the forests to collect firewood and other items essential for their survival. Also, in most cases, it is almost impossible for the CRPF troops to distinguish between an adivasi and a Maoist guerrilla. Sometimes, it leads to rights violations, with the CRPF soldier coming across as an impious villain.

On his part, the CRPF soldier has no idea what he is dealing with. In other counterinsurgency situations — for example, in Kashmir — the situation is far simpler. The CRPF is just not prepared for deployment in the Maoist areas. There are several reasons for this. The CRPF soldier has absolutely no facility at his disposal. His living conditions are pathetic. In the camp, he does not have access to even basic amenities. Across Maoist-affected regions, the situation is the same. As a result, the morale of most of the CRPF soldiers is very low. Many of them want to get away from their situation as soon as possible. There is a chasm between the soldier and the officer. Even the officers want to get away. Many of them are preparing for careers elsewhere.

On the other hand, a Maoist guerrilla is extremely motivated. In many cases, he is even better trained than the CRPF soldier. The Maoists know this entire region very well, and in large areas, the local population is sympathetic to them.

The CRPF soldier hardly gets any support from his organisation, or from the State he is fighting this war for. He is just a sacrificial lamb in this war. And so are the poor adivasis.

So, who is benefitting from this war? Why cannot the adivasis be stakeholders in the wealth created by the extraction of mineral resources in this region? Why is the State unable to rescue a CRPF soldier injured in a Maoist ambush? If the Maoists are against mining, why are they not targeting mining companies in their areas of influence? These are the questions we must ask. And these must be asked outside our drawing rooms.

(Rahul Pandita is Opinion editor of The Hindu >@rahulpandita )

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