On the high seas with America

President Obama’s trip to India has imparted a new dynamic to US-India ties. This follows the rebooting of the relationship following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington in September 2014. Both the leaders have positioned themselves well to shape the future contours of the relationship.

The US-India Joint Strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean agreed upon by the two leaders is a significant development.

India has been traditionally cautious about forays into regional geo-politics. But this reticence is gradually disappearing.

The South China Sea and the Chinese postures in India’s neighbourhood and the developments along the border have all facilitated the change. India is clearly ‘repositioning itself’ from a ‘Continental Power’ which it will remain to a ‘Maritime Power’.

The US intends to capitalise on the rising profile of India to create a strategically stable Asia. However, it is not in India’s interests to become a ‘subsidiary and/or uncritical partner’ of the US.

Assisting one another, is perhaps in the longer term interests of both the countries, though India would want its freedom of action, instead of being perceived as a tool in the hands of the Americans.

The US intends to capitalise on the rising profile and importance of India to create a strategically stable Asia. A deepening security dilemma between India and China in the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and South China Sea has begun to intersect with the ‘increasingly uncertain dynamic between China and the US in the Western pacific. In the South China Sea, China has ‘maritime sovereignty disputes’ with other South East Asian states over ‘Spratly and Paracel’ islands. China and ASEAN are also oil importers.

Given that 92 per cent of Japan’s oil imports are sourced from West Asia and Africa (88 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively) the sea lanes of communication become vital for its economic survival. In India’s case 97 per cent of India’s trade by volume is sea-borne.

Besides, more than 70 per cent if India’s energy needs are sea-borne. This is expected grow to 85 per cent by 2025.

Hence the sea lanes are vital for the sustenance and development of the countries in the region and India. The implications of the strategic cooperation between India and the US cannot be totally lost to countries in this region, especially China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore and Japan. One of the largest economic congregations, the APEC covering 38 per cent of global economies, is also an Asia-Pacific entity, which Prime Minister Modi has now expressed his eagerness to join.

APEC is critical to India’s economic integration into the Asia-pacific region and also to have a major say in the India Ocean region.

Rather than containing China, perhaps the inherent dynamic behind the US-India strategic partnership is to ensure a stable geopolitical order in the Asia-Pacific region. The interests of India and the US vis-a-vis China are closely aligned. Both would like to steer China on a positive course, without being blind to the challenges it poses.

Though India may not be a counter weight, it could be a loose yet credible strategic partner to the US.

On the nuclear deal, the commercial life line that Prime Minister Modi and President Obama have provided to it assumes significance in the context of the overall vision that they have for the future of India-US relations.

The decision to have an India-Government backed insurance pool of Rs 1,500 crore to indemnify the liability of the suppliers indicates a renewed effort to overcome the logjam of the past six years.

The ball is now in the court of the US companies like Westinghouse and General Electric to decide on whether and when to invest. Both these companies have been offered land in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh to build nuclear reactors.

Though the debate over Section 17(b) and 46 of the Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) will continue, yet the decision taken will help provide a positive thrust and momentum to the overall relationship.

On climate change, India’s hesitancy to accept a peak year for emissions perhaps along the lines of the US-China agreement on emission cuts, prevented both leaders for arriving at an amicable understanding. New Delhi argues that a peaking year will put India and China on par, when the ground reality is that China is the world’s largest carbon emitter. India remains the fourth largest emitter with a per capita emissions one-third that of China.

Future working Group negotiations could perhaps lay out an amicable understanding to both the sides.

The protracted war on terror could trigger profound changes in the regional strategic landscape. Both the sides recognise that terrorism is a global scourge, and that counter terrorism constituted an important pillar of the US-India strategic partnership.

India can be a geographic obstruction to an Islamic arc stretching from Morocco across Africa and the Middle East all the way to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In this context India can be a decisive factor in its strategic and cultural campaign being waged against Islamic terrorism. The moot point is that Washington and New Delhi may find it difficult to overlook the economic and strategic long-term value of befriending one another.

The uncertainties and trends in India-Pakistan, China-Pakistan, India-China, US-Pakistan and US-China relations are bound to impact on the evolving strategic partnership between India and the US.

The future challenge lies in how the US and India state their national priorities. Though the future is full of possibilities, we need to tread with ‘cautious optimism’.

The writer teaches at the Department of Political Science, Bangalore University

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