The message is loud and clear. Russia is back in the business of global geopolitics. Debates over the revival of a Russo-American rivalry, gaining currency at least since the Georgian war of 2008, has entered a critical phase with Russia annexing Crimea two weeks ago.

The West did everything practically possible to prevent the Russian move: it threatened to politically isolate Moscow, oust it from the powerful Group-8 bloc forever, impose sanctions, etc.

But nothing could sway President Vladimir Putin’s determination to take control of Crimea — which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet — in response to the West’s support for protests in Ukraine that led to the fall of its pro-Kremlin President Viktor Yanukovych.

The West now accuses Russia of aggression in Ukraine. But Moscow says the annexation doesn’t violate any international law, as a thumping majority of the Crimeans voted in favour of joining Russia in a referendum held on March 16. Both are technical explanations of their respective positions on the Crimean crisis. The political explanation, however, lies elsewhere.

Strategic encircling

Even though the Soviet Union collapsed in early 1990s, the rivalry between the two blocs had not really ended. Moscow was forced to accept defeat and promised a partnership in building a new world order. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the Soviet Union, said the end of Coal War was a victory for both the US and Russia. But neither side believed it. Russia did never give up its ambitions to make a comeback, while the US, wary of a Russian comeback in the future, insisted on expanding its military influence to the Russian borders.

The US strategy was to encircle a feeble Russia to stop, or delay, its re-emergence. In 1994, Bill Clinton started deploying troops in the Balkan region. In 1999, he bombed Yugoslavia under NATO’s banner that led to Kosovo’s secession. The George W Bush administration proposed to install parts of a missile defence complex in Poland and Czech Republic.

For obvious reasons, Russia was suspicious of these moves, but was not in a position to resist as it was still battling post-Soviet blues — the economy was in disarray, unemployment was high and the country was still in search of a visionary leader.

End of retreat

When Putin became the president in 2000, after nearly a decade of anarchy and instability in Russia, his primary focus was to stabilise the economy. Even his critics would admit that he succeeded in rebuilding the economy and changing Russia’s image abroad.

Putin’s first presidency was marked by high economic growth — the economy grew for eight straight years, GDP increased 72 per cent. During his first premiership and presidency (1999–2008), real incomes went up by a factor of 2.5, real wages more than tripled and unemployment and poverty more than halved.

Putin’s energy policy, which advocated strong state control over a substantial part of the oil and gas sector and its revenues, played a crucial role in this economic recovery. The aim was to make Russia an energy superpower. By 2007, Russia’s economic recovery was established.

This turnaround raised Russia’s confidence to be active again in geopolitics. For that, like every great power, it needed its own sphere of influence in the global system. The obvious choice was the former Soviet republics, many of who had already entered into strong tie-ups with the West.

Russia started opposing the NATO’s military outreach to its neighbourhood. When NATO tried to expand to Georgia, Putin felt it was time to act. Taking many by surprise, he sent troops to Georgia in August 2008.

Ever since, Moscow has made it clear several times it wants Western nations to stay away from its traditional area of influence. But the West wasn’t ready to pay heed. This was a major irritant in the Russo-US relations.

New arms race?

By now, it’s clear that Putin has great ambitions. He wants to regain the lost glory of Moscow, and for that, he’s ready to engage in a direct competition with the West. This willingness was manifest in Russia’s Syria policy as well. Syria holds Russia’s lone naval facility outside the former Soviet region — Tartus. Also, Syria is a vital link between Iran and Hezbollah, both enemies of Israel, which is the closest ally of the US in West Asia.

By backing the embattled President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, Russia has not only shown its readiness to protect an ally, but also a strategic eagerness to play a larger role in West Asia, which is traditionally the US’ area of influence.

US President Barack Obama had to change his aggressive Syria policy in the face of strong Russian opposition and opt for international diplomacy to deal with the Assad regime. Ukraine was the third stop, and will certainly be not the last.

Putin’s immediate strategy, as Georgia, Syria and Ukraine tell us, is to prevent the Western incursions into Russia’s traditional areas of influence. Russia will also attempt to expand these areas as it grows stronger. Western nations, especially the US, are unlikely to take it cool, but they don’t have the wherewithal to punish Russia economically in this age of globalisation. If a trade war breaks out, both sides will suffer.

This explains why the sanctions announced by the US and the EU were so weak. But that doesn’t mean the US will let go easily. Its immediate response to the Ukraine crisis indicates it will opt for enhanced security tie-ups with its Eastern European allies.

US Vice-President Joe Biden has already visited Balkan nations to assure them of Washington’s security commitment.

In Warsaw, Polish President Bronisław Maria Komorowski even reminded Biden of the arms race of the 1980s which, in his view, played a crucial role in ending the ‘Soviet aggression’. One will not be surprised if Bush’s original plan of setting up a missile defence shield, parts of which were to be installed in Russia’s border region, makes a comeback.

East-West cooperation, one of the key pillars of the post-Soviet world, is steadily turning to East-West rivalry. What both sides will do next on Crimea will define the rules of the new Cold War.

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