Last year at the IISS Shangri-La dialogue, Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined India’s conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific as a geographic continuum stretching from the east coast of Africa to the shores of America. India didn’t adopt Indo-Pacific at the behest of the US.

As is the case with regions that are imagined spaces, there exist competing conceptualisations regarding its geographical expanse; depending upon the actor(s) imagining it. India’s definition includes the western Indian Ocean (and “for something, not against somebody,” according to External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar), while the US perceives the Indo-Pacific as a containment strategy region extending from the shores of America to the west coast of India.

As Alyssa Ayres, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said, “the US Indo-Pacific strategy needs more Indian Ocean.” The US National Security Strategy document (NSS) remains silent on the Western Indian Ocean maritime space including the eastern coast of Africa and the Arabian Sea — priorities for India’s strategic interest. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), jointly established by India and South Africa in 1967, broadly traverses the geography pointed out by Modi in his Shangri-La speech.

Choke points

Substantial volumes of maritime trade and shipping lanes pass-through the Western Indian Ocean Region (WIOR). Strategic choke points like the Strait of Hormuz act as a conduit for oil markets in the Middle East to Asia, Europe, and North America. It is estimated that around one-fifth of the world’s oil (amounting to 20.7 million barrels per day) is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. The recent tensions in the Strait have the potential to significantly undermine global energy security. Given its arterial role in the global oil and natural gas trade, the exclusion of that region from the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct could compromise the objective of ensuring free and open sea lines of communication.

Besides energy security, Middle Eastern states like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are home to Indian diaspora — with significant political, economic, and strategic interest. Therefore, India, which aims to play a leading role in global affairs, couldn’t afford to discount the Middle East/West Asia from the Indo-Pacific strategic calculus. For the US, the extension of the Indo-Pacific framework to the region could help arrest its waning influence in the Middle East. The timing is crucial as Middle Eastern countries are trying to diversify their economy and countries such as the US, India, Japan, France, and Australia, with their requisite expertise, could take the lead in this regard.

China’s inroads into Africa

East African littoral states have acquired salience in the global matrix; Africa is poised to be the next growth frontier. McKinsey & Company, in its report ‘Lions on the Move’, estimated that the region would generate $2.6 trillion in revenue by 2020. Economics aside, this area has recently become a hotbed for powers vying for influence.

China replaced the US as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009, which currently stands at more than $200 billion. Last year, Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion at the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Militarily, China has constructed a naval base in Djibouti overlooking the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb — the fourth most important choke-point for oil and natural gas.

The Horn of Africa — usually the epicentre of protracted armed conflicts — is increasingly becoming the ground for assertion by Middle Eastern states. It is witnessing the power play of the Arab axis (Saudi Arab and the UAE), Iran axis, and Qatar-Turkey axis. Any spillover of Middle Eastern rivalry could lead to slippage in political stability of the Horn of African states. This could affect the shipping routes along the Red Sea coast and the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, the application of rule of law under the aegis of the Indo-Pacific framework is quintessential for the region.

These analyses argue for the extension of the Indo-Pacific framework to the Western Indian Ocean Region. However, it is also being argued that the US Indo-Pacific command (USIPACOM) signals India’s rise in a particular politico-military theatre of world politics, and the subsequent discourse ensures “de-centering of China” and simultaneously points to India’s place in the American envisaged world order.

Therefore, convergence on competing conceptualisations is easier said than done. That said, it is pertinent to iron out differences that could impede cohesiveness in the Indo-Pacific construct. Divergence exists in US and India world-views with respect to the troubled West Indian Ocean littorals such as Pakistan and Iran. While India has been vocal about Pakistan’s support of terrorists, the US approaches Pakistan from the vantage point of Afghanistan.

Similarly, the exiting from the P5 nuclear deal by the Trump administration has not only affected India’s energy security but also its pet project, the Chabahar Port, the location of which serves as a gateway to Afghanistan and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which could significantly contribute to the advancement of the Indo-Pacific framework.

An issue of concern

The current US Indo-Pacific Command (USIPACOM) excludes Western Indian Ocean littorals like Pakistan from its sphere of influence, a concerning issue to India. A cohesive Indo-Pacific framework would require the merging of the US Central Command to the newly created Indo-Pacific Command for increased operability.

India, on the other hand, needs to fit the Western Pacific (especially the South China Sea) in its strategic calculations. India’s response to the recent Vanguard Reef incident in the South China Sea was largely superficial in spite of India having commercial interests in the region; ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) operates oil blocks in the South China Sea. Therefore, any attempt to militarise the South China Sea severely undermines India’s genuine interest.

As far as India is concerned, the creation of the Indo-Pacific division under its Ministry of External Affairs and the recent Quad foreign ministers meeting debunk allegations of New Delhi being non-serious. The signing of a logistics exchange agreement between the US and France has greatly aided India’s interoperability by access to the US and French naval bases; the vice-versa is also true.

An extension of the same to Japan and Australia (both being negotiated) would complete the web of maritime security partnerships combining both the oceans. The possibility of the US, Australia, and France joining the Indo-Japan-Asia-Africa Growth Corridor could be contemplated. It has the potential to provide robust material and normative foundation to the Indo-Pacific framework, ensuring security and growth for all in the region.

It is pertinent to note that sustained economic growth over two decades and investment in weapon systems have facilitated India’s ascendance in the hierarchy of international politics, bestowing upon it substantial capability to diffuse its own idea in the strategic space. This necessitates a need for a coherent Indo-Pacific framework to harmonise the competing conceptualisations.

The writer works as a Research Associate, Centre for Strategic and Foreign Relations at Vision India Foundation, New Delhi. This article is by special arrangement with the Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.