Shortly before the 2014 elections, Narendra Modi — at that time practically a novice in foreign affairs — stated in an interview that “my Hindutva face will be an asset when dealing with foreign affairs with other nations.” This statement might have been indicative of a strict ideological, assertive foreign policy posture that put India first in all its future engagements. Yet, an analysis of five years of National Democratic Alliance’s (NDA’s) foreign policy only reveals changes in direction and scope, but no traits of strict adherence to a genuine Hindutva ideology, or any ideology for that matter.

In the BJP Election Manifesto 2014, the party did not use the term “Hindutva foreign policy” and dealt with international affairs in three pages only. The wish to “reboot and reorient” foreign policy was expressed as the strengthening of Indian soft power or the establishment of a new web of alliances.

Taking a bird’s eye view of select bilateral and multilateral foreign policy developments from 2014-19, it is obvious that Prime Minister Modi has been much more visible and outspoken and travelled more than any of his predecessors. The inviting of Modi’s South Asian counterparts to the swearing-in ceremony in May 2014 hinted at a strong focus towards India’s neighbours and created expectations of closer bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Modi’s first visit to Sri Lanka in 2015 seemed like a harbinger of things to come, successfully stressing future cooperation and cultural unity. However, the relationship has suffered since then, especially because of Sri Lanka’s decision to lease the port of Hambantota to China, effectively allowing a 99-year Chinese presence on the island.

The Maldives, despite Indian overtures, still ratified a free trade agreement with China (as did Pakistan) and with Nepal, despite Modi’s initial outreach and support after the earthquake in 2015; the country’s new federal constitution of 2015 led to a dramatic worsening of bilateral ties. All in all, countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood have been successfully incorporated into China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, with an adequate Indian response still at large.

A low point

As for Pakistan, the relationship initially saw the same kinds of ups (Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore in December 2015) and downs (attacks by Pakistan-backed terrorists in Kashmir; regular and deadly skirmishes along the Line of Control) that previous governments experienced. Currently, relations with Pakistan have reached a low point. However, surgical strikes and the use of the Indian air force to target terror camps inside Pakistani territory show a new, assertive foreign policy stance toward Pakistan.

Overall, with respect to its immediate neighbourhood, the Modi government has followed a course of policy continuity, except for Pakistan. As for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there has only been one summit in the past five years, and progress has stalled especially in the face of Indo-Pak enmity.

The Modi government has reached out to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) more than previous Indian governments, with Modi visiting Mauritius and the Seychelles, in addition to an increased engagement with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IROA). Modi updated Indian policies toward Southeast Asia, which resulted in the Act East-Policy (AEP), a new version of the Look East-Policy of the 1990s.

Next to Pakistan, it is with regard to China that Indian foreign policy has seen the most dramatic changes. Despite highly promising signs of cooperation in the beginning, the bilateral political relationship has not flourished. India did have a much more pronounced foreign policy regarding Indo-Chinese border issues, yet a brief stand-off at Doklam marked the low-point of Indo-Sino engagement.

India subsequently did not attend the Belt and Road Forum, citing grave concerns over the building of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. However, Modi did hold an informal summit with President Xi Jinping in Wuhan 2018 to work on better ties with China.

Conversely, the US-India relationship has seen a deepening of ties, especially both the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) from 2016, aimed at facilitating logistical support and services between both militaries, followed by the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 to facilitate access to advanced defence systems showcase that this crucial strategic partnership has grown in depth.

While India’s relationship with Russia saw a downturn, ties with Japan saw an upswing. In 2014, Japan and India entered into a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” and significant progress in the areas of infrastructure cooperation or nuclear energy and technology have taken place. India has also built stronger links with the Gulf countries and fully normalised its bilateral ties with Israel.

As a first and clear sign of its new standing, India was invited to address the inaugural session of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in March 2019, and India’s new outreach to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is bound to bring political and economic benefits, with India already a major customer of Gulf oil.

In multilateral settings, India started to engage in the quadrilateral (Quad), a grouping that also includes the US, Japan, and Australia. Despite repeated attempts, India was eventually denied entry into global governance platforms such as the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, on India’s appeal, the UN introduced worldwide International Yoga Day (June 21). The latter, especially, was heralded as a new sign of global Indian outreach. And, finally, connecting with the Indian diaspora around the world has been an important objective for the NDA government.

No radical transformation

Indian foreign policy has not seen a complete or radical transformation in terms of becoming a “new” Hindutva-guided foreign policy. Modi did try to connect foreign policy with Indian values by stressing civilisational and religious ties with South and Southeast Asia and by focussing on yoga and the Indian diaspora. Still, there was continuity in India’s relationship with the major powers and its extended neighbourhood.

What is more, India’s new assertive posture towards both Pakistan and China and a host of new strategic partnerships — such as the ones with Saudi Arabia and UAE — are actually indicators of a new foreign policy pragmatism. A Hindutva foreign policy, faced with a myriad of geopolitical and geo-economic necessities, as it was in the past five years, simply did not lend itself to becoming a new Indian foreign policy orientation or grand strategy. Instead, pragmatism has clearly eclipsed Hindutva.

The writer, an award-winning author, is with Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Germany. This article is by special arrangement with the Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.