A perpetual mess that is Afghanistan

Even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi was cautioning Americans in New York against a precipitate withdrawal, Afghanistan was preparing for momentous change in Kabul. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai was taking over as Afghanistan’s president from Hamid Karzai, who ruled Afghanistan for 12 turbulent years. Despite efforts by worthy Americans such as Peter Galbraith and Richard Holbrooke to malign him and destabilise his government, and despite a vicious propaganda barrage from Pakistan, President Karzai succeeded in establishing a measure of effective governance in Afghanistan. He also skilfully brought together the country’s fractious ethnic groups, to deal with the challenge posed by the Pakistani-backed Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network, together with their Islamist allies, including the al Qaeda.

The change of guard has not been smooth. The first round of elections in April produced no clear winner. The second round in June produced a stunning result. It gave an unexpectedly large victory margin to Ghani over his rival, Abdullah Abdullah, a former foreign minister and close aide of the legendary political and military leader Ahmed Shah Masood. Abdullah had a substantial lead in the first round, securing 46 per cent of the votes, against 32 per cent for Ghani.

Strange elections A report by the European Union declared the second round of voting as “massively rigged”. A US report held that it was mathematically impossible for Ghani to have secured the margin of victory that he did. With controversy over the electoral result spiralling out of control and assuming volatile ethnic dimensions, the Americans stepped in, to broker and virtually impose an uneasy and tenuous compromise between Ghani and Abdullah.

Following the agreement between the rival candidates, Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as president and Abdullah as ‘chief executive’, a post which has no constitutional sanctity. The road map for this transition includes the convening of a loya jirga or grand assembly to convert the post of chief executive into that of an executive prime minister.

It remains to be seen whether the contemplated changes, with two separate centres of executive authority, can provide stable and effective governance in a country beset with ethnic rivalries and tensions. Within 24 hours of the assumption of power by Ghani and Abdullah, Afghanistan and the US inked a security agreement which will result in the US stationing 9,800 troops in a training and counter-insurgency role in Afghanistan, beyond 2014. A “status of forces agreement” giving immunity to foreign forces against prosecution in Afghan courts was also inked. It will allow the Americans to retain air bases across Afghanistan.

Pakistan turnaround Pakistan has welcomed these developments. Apart from formal statements by National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz and the foreign office, a meeting of the top brass of the Pakistan army also welcomed this development as a “good move for peace in Afghanistan”.

This is an astonishing turnaround for a Pakistani establishment that has all along made known its unease with the American presence in Afghanistan. It comes at a time when an estimated 80,000 Pakistani troops and paramilitary, backed by air power, are pounding positions of the Tehriq-e-Taliban in North Waziristan — an operation resulting in an estimated one million tribal Pashtuns fleeing their homes. At the same time, the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban have been on the rampage this year across Afghanistan, prompting the soft-spoken Ghani to say: “We ask the opponents of the government, especially the Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami to enter political talks.”

Pakistan’s massive military offensive in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan has been selectively undertaken. Long-term ISI assets including the Haqqani Network, the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban and even the Al Zawahiri-led al Qaeda have been spared and obviously accommodated in ISI safe houses. They will be kept in readiness to move into Afghanistan at a time of Pakistan’s choosing.

Afghanistan is going to remain dependent on NATO for military and economic funding. NATO funding of Afghanistan’s military of $5.1 billion annually till 2017 has been agreed upon. A similar amount of external funding would be required for Afghanistan’s administrative and developmental needs.

The joint declaration issued after the Barack Obama-Narendra Modi summit spoke of “dismantling of safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical support for terrorist and criminal networks such as al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, the D-Company, and the Haqqanis”. Significantly, there is no mention in the joint declaration of the Mullah Omar-led Taliban, which has been primarily responsible for the killing of 2,229 American soldiers in Afghanistan, the training of terrorists for jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, and for colluding with the hijackers of IC814.

The American angle It has been obvious for some time that the Americans are keen to do a deal with the Taliban. They may pay lip service to statements that any internal reconciliation process has to be “Afghan-led”. But, the reality is different, ever since the US encouraged Qatar to host a Taliban office in Doha. An enraged Karzai torpedoed that American effort, with obvious Pakistani support, to grant international legitimacy to the Taliban. Ghani will, however, have to reluctantly accept Pakistan-brokered American-Taliban “contacts” as a prelude to sign Taliban control in parts of southern Afghanistan.

India cannot be sanguine about these developments. A priority of the Obama administration will be to smoothly take out its military equipment from Afghanistan, through Pakistan. The Taliban will be looked on rather more benignly than in the past. Militarily, the ISI/Taliban effort will be to seize control of large swathes of territory in southern Afghanistan, compelling a reduction of India’s assistance in that part of the country.

Differences in the priorities and compulsions of Ghani and Abdullah in Kabul appear inevitable. Our membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will have to be utilised to fashion a more coordinated approach with its members Russia, China, Iran and the Central Asian Republics.

A more intensive approach on developing the Port of Chah Bahar in Iran and on meeting Afghan requirements of defence equipment will be imperative. The post 9/11 “end game” for the Americans in Afghanistan has only just begun.

(The author is a former high commissioner to Pakistan)

COMMENT NOW