The Hindu Business Line : Future of India-US nuclear deal

Despite the Prime Minister's clear enunciation of what precisely India will and will not accept in any legislation passed by the US Congress, it is clear that it will be difficult to conclude a mutually acceptable agreement with the US on nuclear cooperation in the face of several ground realities. It would be useful, though, to find the diplomatic space to conclude such an agreement, says G. PARTHASARATHY.

After having wasted huge amounts of public money for two weeks on puerile controversies generated by the foibles two former Foreign Ministers, Messrs Jaswant Singh and Natwar Singh, the Members of the Rajya Sabha showed they are capable of raising Parliamentary debate to very high levels that the country can be proud of, on August 17, when the Indo-US nuclear deal came up for debate and discussion.

The Left Parties pointed out the serious implications of long-term dependence on nuclear fuel from the US for the independence of our foreign policy.

The BJP established the dangerous implications for national security of provisions in the proposed US legislation, designed to "cap, roll back and eliminate" our nuclear weapons capabilities.

The Treasury Benches came up with spirited replies. But, above all, the day belonged to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who came out with a high-voltage Parliamentary performance, combining nostalgia and emotion with a clear enunciation of what precisely India would and would not accept in any legislation passed by the US Congress.

The July 18, 2005 Agreement between President Bush and Dr Manmohan Singh was a historic attempt to end three decades of international sanctions and isolation that India has faced from the US and the 45-member US-led Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The Agreement was carefully crafted to assure India continued supply of nuclear fuel and guarantee the continuity of our nuclear weapons programmes, while expressing India's willingness to participate constructively in such international initiatives as concluding a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty.

While India pledged to maintain its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, we have always made it clear that the moratorium permitted us to carry out nuclear tests necessitated by "extraordinary events". Our unilateral moratorium was certainly not a signal that India would accept a de facto Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban in perpetuity.

The Legislation proposed by the Senate International Relations Committee and the House of Representatives clearly violates all these understandings. On March 7, 2006 Dr Manmohan Singh announced that "the United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel" for the lifetime of imported reactors and that both countries will jointly convene a "group of friendly countries like Russia, France and the UK" to restore fuel supply to India in the event of a US cut off.

The conditionalities

The Legislation now proposed states that not only does the US Congress require annual certification of India's compliance with its views on extraneous issues, such as relations with Iran, but also requires the US to get other members of the NSG to end nuclear cooperation with India, if so required by US laws.

Given our past experience when fuel supplies that the US had guaranteed for the Tarapur Power Plant from 1963 to 1993 were unilaterally terminated and the Clinton Administration's efforts to coerce countries like France and Russia to end nuclear cooperation with India, it would be naïve to expect that another President, with views and priorities like Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton, in the White House, two years from now, would be as friendly and forthcoming as President Bush.

Dr Manmohan Singh has also assuaged concerns about our strategic nuclear weapons programme by making it clear that provisions mandating an end to nuclear fuel supplies in the event of another nuclear test were unacceptable.

It should be evident from this that India will not accept conditions that the Senate International Relations Committee is seeking to impose, which would prohibit us from carrying out hydronuclear tests, which are essential to establish the reliability of our nuclear weapons systems.

He has also clarified that India will join a FMCT only if such a Treaty, which would involve our ending production of enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, is "non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and verifiable".

Given the continuing clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons materials, designs and know-how between China and Pakistan and the growing strength of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in our neighbourhood, it would be foolish for India to accede to any Treaty ending fissile material production, unless all China's nuclear facilities are subject to the same rigours of international inspection as those of India.

Research and disarmament

One hopes that, in future Parliamentary debates, an assurance will be given by the Government that that there will be no shortage of funds provided to our nuclear research establishment, for our indigenous fast breeder reactor programme.

We should be proud of the fact that India is one of the world leaders in the development of thorium-based power reactor technologies.

Despite the scepticism that has been voiced about this programme by some well-meaning foreign experts, energy security can by guaranteed only by the success of this programme and not by dependence on imports. It should be evident that even strenuous efforts by President Bush will not lead to unacceptable conditions currently placed by the US Congress being withdrawn from the final legislation that will emerge from both Houses of the US Congress.

It is also going to be difficult to conclude a mutually acceptable bilateral agreement with the US on nuclear cooperation in the face of these ground realities, though it would be useful to find diplomatic space for concluding such an agreement.

We also need to see how the NSG ends its sanctions and how countries like France, Russia and the UK respond to opposition to the removal of sanctions from Scandinavian countries and members of the "New Agenda Coalition," which still cherish fond illusions that India will "cap, roll back and eliminate" its nuclear weapons programme.

We have for the past few years played a less than active role in promoting the cause of global and verifiable nuclear disarmament, losing the moral high ground we had earlier, primarily out of fears of American opposition. A renewed push for such global nuclear disarmament should be high on our diplomatic agenda.

Over the past two years there has been a noticeable drift in our national security policies. We now have no Central legislation to deal with terrorism. Our missile programme is in the doldrums with inadequate testing of missiles like the Agni 1 and Agni 2 and the failure of the much delayed Agni 3 test. Our Air Force is grossly under strength, with programmes for new acquisitions proceeding at a leisurely pace. One wonders whether our Nuclear Command Authority ever meets.

While Dr Manmohan Singh has resorted to new and imaginative ways to carry forward the dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, including that of Jammu and Kashmir, resort to "out of the box" thinking on issues like a withdrawal of forces from Siachen, without demarcating existing positions, could well prove costly for future generations.

One would do well to remember that Gen Musharraf was emboldened to intrude across the LOC in Kargil in 1999 after India had lost the qualitative edge it enjoyed earlier, following drastic reductions in the Defence budget in the early 1990s.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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