The Hindu Business Line : Is Pakistan a terror ‘victim’?

Recent testimony by an American academic to the US House Foreign Affairs Committee contains a message for those who mistakenly believe that terrorism against India is being conducted by “freelance terrorist groups”. The Government has to get its act together in dealing with sponsored terror from across the border instead of placing faith in the unworkable ‘Joint Terror Mechanism’, says G. PARTHASARATHY

Constant vigil is the watchword for India in dealing with cross-border terror.

Dr Manmohan Singh astonished the country after a meeting with the Pakistan President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, in Havana in September 2006, when he announced that like India, Pakistan was also a “victim” of terrorism. He then proceeded to tell his baffled countrymen and the world at large that the terrorist violence in India was not being perpetrated by the ISI, but by “autonomous jehadi groups.”

The Prime Minister had earlier proclaimed that the dialogue process with Pakistan was “irreversible”, suggesting, as a perceptive observer noted, that: “the threshold of our tolerance for Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism has no limits”. He also proudly announced the establishment of a “Joint Terror Mechanism” with Pakistan, which was to be the magic mantra for curing all the ills of ISI sponsorship of terrorism.

This ill-conceived proposal has fallen by the wayside, with Pakistan renouncing its earlier pledge not to allow “territory under its control” to be used for terrorism against India, by claiming that the violence in J&K was not terrorism, but a “freedom struggle.”

Toeing The US line?

Testimony given by American academic and erstwhile adviser to Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, Ashley Tellis to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 16 suggests that Dr Manmohan Singh’s comments in Havana may well have been made in order to bring India’s foreign policy in line with the US, which was determined not to do anything to embarrass its favourite General in Islamabad.

Describing the US approach to broker a Benazir-Musharraf political alliance Tellis said that Benazir’s assassination had “undermined the Administration’s efforts to broker a ‘marriage of convenience’ between Bhutto and Musharraf that would produce a governing dispensation that is civilian in appearance, accept Musharraf’s continuance in office, because of his importance to US interests and strengthen the elements of moderation in Pakistan. Bhuttto’s violent end instantaneously fractured these goals.”

Were Dr Manmohan Singh and his aides absolving Gen Musharraf of all responsibility in sponsoring terrorism in Havana, either because of Musharraf’s “importance to US interests,” or were they carried away by the American advocacy that Musharraf is our “best bet” also?

Tellis has painted a grim scenario ahead for Musharraf, who has pledged that his “re-election” by the outgoing lame duck National Assembly would be submitted to the incoming National Assembly for validation. He notes that Pakistan’s people “are tired of both President Musharraf and entrenched military rule,” adding “they are unlikely to give Musharraf the benefit of the doubt if the February elections are marked by gross irregularities.”

With polls by the International Republican Institute estimating Musharraf’s support as varying between 21 per cent and 30 per cent, it should be evident that unless the elections are massively rigged (a scenario that is not entirely improbable according to Tellis), Musharraf will face an assembly with those opposed to him enjoying a majority.

According to Tellis: “Musharraf’s problems are that he cannot countenance any National Assembly that would not agree to validate his election, or restore Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhury and his associates,” who were dismissed for refusing to endorse the patently unconstitutional Provisional Constitution Order abrogating fundamental rights, issued by Musharraf. With the new Army Chief, Gen Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, ordering his officers to stay away from politics and politicians and with around one hundred former Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals demanding Musharraf’s resignation, the besieged former General can hardly expect the army to come rushing to his aid, in the event of a political confrontation. Moreover, Musharraf’s outbursts against the judiciary, lawyers and political parties while visiting European countries, have not endeared him to mainstream civil society.

TYPES OF TERRORISM

Referring to terrorism emanating from territory under Pakistan’s control, Tellis notes that there are five different types of terrorism that one has to look at. First, there is sectarian terrorism (domestic) by extremist Sunni, Wahhabi oriented groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

Second, there is terrorism sponsored by groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen involved in terrorism in J&K and elsewhere in India. Third, there is the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e_Pakistan led by Baitullah Mehsud, who despite denials, is conveniently accused of masterminding Benazir’s assassination. This group virtually controls the tribal areas along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.

Fourth, there is the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar operating against the Karzai regime and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Finally, there is the Al-Qaeda and its Uzbek and other affiliates, operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in North Waziristan.

Tellis notes that since September 2001 Gen Musharraf has pursued a “highly differentiated counter-terrorism policy”. He has acted against indigenous sectarian outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Al Qaeda and its “non-South Asian affiliates”. Tellis confirms that, in contrast, Musharraf has “largely ignored” terrorist outfits operating against India and dealt with the Taliban controlled by Mullah Omar “more akin to the Kashmiri terrorists and has avoided targeting them (Afghan Taliban) comprehensively. He (Musharraf) has specially overlooked their leadership, now resident in and around Quetta.”

Strategy of establishment

Tellis argues that this strategy practised by Musharraf since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 is not just his personal approach, but evidently constitutes the considered strategy of the Pakistan military establishment. He adds: “Because the original Taliban and especially its Kandahar leadership is critical to Islamabad’s objectives vis-À-vis Afghanistan, just as the Kashmiri terrorist groups vis-À-vis India, the Pakistan State has refrained from attacking them in any significant way.

The Tellis testimony contains a message for those who express “grudging admiration” for Musharraf, wail that terrorism against India is being conducted by “freelance terrorist groups” and believe that ill-conceived ideas like the “Joint Terror Mechanism” will end Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. He concludes: “Even if Musharraf was to exit the political scene at some point, Islamabad’s currently discordant counter-terrorism strategy will still survive so long as the ‘men on horseback’ continue to be principal guardians of national security decision-making in Islamabad”.

One cannot, however, agree with the optimism that Tellis expresses on securing Pakistani co-operation to hunt down the Al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden, who suffers from renal failure, requiring regular dialysis, cannot survive all these years without high quality medical attention, which is hardly available in the mountains of North Waziristan.

The Pakistanis fear, not without justification, that should Osama meet his end, there will be little prospect of their getting the massive American assistance they now receive. Pakistan’s support for the Bush Administration’s “War on Terror” has resulted in the country receiving around $10 billion of American assistance since 2001.

As much as 57 per cent of this aid amounting to $5.64 billion has been for logistical and other support that Pakistan provides for American forces operating in Afghanistan. But, more importantly, one hopes that our Government will get its act together in dealing with continuing acts of terrorism sponsored from across the border. The ISI, by all accounts, is set to continue using terrorism as an instrument of state policy, in both India and Afghanistan.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)