The Hindu Business Line : Re-think relations with Bangladesh

Recording his impressions about the people of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in his diaries, Pakistan’s first military dictator, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, observed: “When thinking of the problems of East Pakistan, one cannot help feeling that their (Muslim Bengalis’) urge to isolate themselves from West Pakistan and revert to Hindu language and culture is close to the fact that hey have no culture and language of their own, nor have they been able to assimilat e the culture of the Muslims of the sub-continent, by turning their backs on Urdu. This has been a great tragedy for them and the rest of Pakistan. They lack literature on the philosophy of Islam.” Given such views, Bangladeshi anger at the contempt shown for them by the Punjabi-dominated West Pakistani military-bureaucratic elite led to the disintegration of Jinnah’s Pakistan.

The seeds for Pakistan’s disintegration were, however, not sown by Ayub Khan, but by Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself, when Pakistan’s founder proclaimed shortly after the country’s birth that Urdu, which was not the mother tongue of either the people of East or West Pakistan, would be the sole national language of Pakistan. It betrayed a total a lack of understanding of the complex sense of identity of Bengal’s Muslims, who while zealous in their religious beliefs, were equally proud of their distinct linguistic, cultural and spiritual heritage.

I recall that during the tumultuous days of 1971, veteran journalist Girilal Jain remarked to me that the emergence of Bangladesh was a “triumph of the heritage of Nazrul Islam over the ideology of Allama Iqbal,” suggesting that the birth of Bangladesh symbolised the victory of Bengali cultural heritage over religiously oriented separatism.

National Identity

Now in the fourth decade since its liberation, has Bangladesh really determined a viable and durable sense of national identity? In the answer to this question lies the future of that country and the future of its relationship with India and the outside word. The Awami League, which led the struggle for independence was secular in its orientation. Sheikh Mujib declared Bangladesh a secular republic. But the military rulers who succeeded him, Maj Gen Zia ur Rahman and Lt. Gen H. M. Ershad, were determined that Bangladesh should have a distinctive Islamic identity.

Throughout its history, the major challenge that Bangladesh has faced is its quest for an identity that has Islamic features, harmoniously blended with its cultural and linguistic heritage. An excessive focus on religion, as the Pakistanis and fundamentalist elements in Bangladesh and elsewhere would like, would destroy the very basis of its struggle against west Pakistani domination. And if religion is to be excluded, how can Bangladeshis claim to be different from their Bengali counterparts in West Bengal?

This quest for defining national identity has been the major factor in determining how different sections of the Bangladeshi elite view relations with India. Under the leadership of Begum Khaleda Zia the emphasis was on defining Bangladesh’s identity by building an adversarial relationship with India. Throughout her two tenures as Prime Minister, Begum Khaleda sought to unite her country by raising fears about Indian domination. This was reinforced by blatant support for insurgents in India’s North-East and a readiness to make common cause with Pakistan, in attempts to destabilise India.

Reinforcing these trends was Begum Khaleda’s alliance with Islamic fundamentalist parties such as the Jamat-e-Islami and the Islami Oikya Jote. Her aversion to the events of 1971 was evident from the fact that when her friend and Pakistan’s army chief, Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua, died, she sent a personal message of condolences. However, while thousands of Bangladeshis signed the Condolence Book opened by the Indian High Commissioner, Ms Veena Sikri, when Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Arora died, a notable absentee was Begum Khaleda.

New Regime in Dhaka

In assessing the approach of the military-backed Government of Mr Fakharuddin Ahmed in Dhaka, New Delhi will have to bear in mind that its approach towards India will be influenced by its attitude towards issue of Bangladesh’s national identity and towards its struggle for independence in 1971. Relations with Bangladesh have improved in recent days, with such issues as border demarcation and trade and energy cooperation being positively addressed. That country’s approach to issues pertaining to Indian insurgent groups operating from its soil has been more forthcoming than in the recent past, though doubts till remain about its readiness to effectively prevent Bangladeshi territory being used as a springboard for violence in India.

The regime has acted decisively against Islamist terrorism by hanging six members of the Jamat-ul-Mujahideen convicted for the serial bomb blasts of August 2005. But with political activities by mainstream parties banned, the Islamic parties operating from mosques and madrassas are having a field day. There also appears to be an absence of will to act against terrorist groups such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami, an ISI backed outfit with links to the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, whi ch is accused of involvement in terrorist attacks across India.

The present “interim” dispensation recognises the significance of the 1971 liberation struggle and acknowledges India’s role. It has secured the extradition from the US of Moinuddin Ahmed for his role in the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujib. At the same time, the real power behind the throne, Gen Moeen U Ahmed, has dealt very toughly with leaders of both mainstream political parties — the Awami League and the BNP. There have been arrests of former Ministers accused of corruption, from both parties. Sheikh Hasina remains barred from political activity. Begum Khaleda is under virtual house arrest. Her elder son, Tarique Rahman, is behind bars for corruption and extortion. Her younger son, Arafat Rahman, is also detained.

Growth of Extremism

While New Delhi appears relieved by recent developments in Bangladesh, a prolonged period of military rule will inevitably strengthen fundamentalist elements there. Spiralling inflation is already fuelling discontent.

While encouraging the present dispensation to restore democracy, India should refrain from shrill public noises on the subject. Pakistan is fishing in troubled waters, strengthening its links with extremist elements, many of which are funded by such Islamic “charities” as Saudi Arabia’s “Al Harmain Institute” and the “Rabita al Alam al Islami” and Kuwait’s “Revival of Islamic Heritage’.

The growth of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh poses threats to regional and global security and will have to be addressed diplomatically.

The Interim Government also appears to be ready for more wide ranging economic cooperation with India than the regimes of either Begum Khaleda or Sheikh Hasina. While Begum Khaleda’s approach was guided by her desire to be seen as being guarded in relations with India, Sheikh Hasina was very cautious in cooperating with India in sensitive areas such as energy, because of fears that she would be accused of a “sell out”.

The present regime appears to be ready to undertake projects in collaboration with Indian companies such as BHEL and provide transit for a gas pipeline from Myanmar. It remains to be seen how it responds to the offer by Tatas for large-scale investments estimated at $2.5 billion in key sectors of steel, fertilisers and power.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)